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Abstract
I develop a model of contracting under reciprocal altruism accounting
for some evidence which is paradoxical from the point of view of neo-
classical models with selfish actors. My model predicts the crowding-out
effect observed in the Trust Game with the possibility of a fine; for the
Control Game the model predicts that an equilibrium can exhibit ”no ef-
fect of control”, ”hidden cost of control”, or ”positive effect of control”,
depending on the characteristics of the actors, as observed in the lab.
This suggests that reciprocal altruism modeling could be fruitful more
generally in applications of contract theory.
Keywords: Contract Theory, Signaling, Behavioral Economics, Reciprocal
Altruism, Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, Experimental Economics.
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1 Introduction
Intriguing observations about human response to incentives have recently been
made. For instance, providing additional incentives can, in contrast with stan-
dard models with selfish actors, lead to lower levels of performance and in-
tentions seem to matter, according to Fehr and Rockenbach [2003], Falk and
Kosfeld [2006] and many others1.
In this paper I develop a Principal-Agent model embodying reciprocal al-
truism. An important contribution of the paper is that a simple formal model
of reciprocal altruism is able to give reliable predictions for human behavior.
While the idea that reciprocity, altruism and other forms of social preferences
shape people’s behavior is not new, there are only a few models of reciprocal
altruism in the literature.
My model is based on a simple idea that a person cares more about those
who care more about him. In other words, a person is more altruistic towards
∗I’m grateful to Jean Tirole for many insightful discussions. I’m also grateful to Stefanie
Brillon, Andrey Bremzen, Robert Dur, Arjan Non, the participants of the BEE workshop in
Toulouse, and the participants of the seminars in ECARES(Brussels), Gothenburg University,
CEFIR(Moscow) for their comments.
1See below the more detailed discussion of the relevant literature.
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those whom he perceives as being altruistic towards him. This is the essence of
the reciprocal altruism. In the Principal-Agent relationship, an altruistic Agent
is inspired to exert effort even in the absence of monetary incentives, i.e. the
Agent’s altruism works as an intrinsic motivator. If furthermore, the Agent
is reciprocal, the Principal should demonstrate his altruism in order to inspire
the Agent’s intrinsic motivation. This leads to a signaling game in which the
Principal signals his altruism through offering a ”generous” contract.
After analyzing the signaling game with intrinsic motivation only, I incor-
porate extrinsic incentives. I follow the frameworks of the two well known lab
experiments of Fehr and Rockenbach [2003] and Falk and Kosfeld [2006] to in-
vestigate how the predictions of my model match the empirical evidence. I show
that most of the observed patterns of behavior in the experiments are predicted
by the model.
The behavioral patterns observed in the experiments are not limited to the
lab, they are common in human relations, in the workplace in particular. The
evidence from the field is documented in Gneezy [2002], Falk [2007], Bolton and
Ockenfels [2008], Paarsch and Shearer [2007], Shearer [2004], Bellemare and
Shearer [2007], Berry and Kanouse [1987], Mare´chal and Tho¨ni [2007].2
The relevance of altruism and reciprocity are supported by compelling evi-
dence in the literature.
The Dictator Game introduced in Kahneman et al. [1986] provides evidence
for pure altruism3. The survey of Andreoni [2006] demonstrates that impure al-
truism - taste for ”warm glow” shapes people’s decisions in many circumstances.
The evidence for reciprocity4 is provided by Berg et al. [1995] who introduced
the Trust Game, which was repeated with modifications in Fehr and Rocken-
bach [2003], Fehr and List [2004] and others. The evidence also comes from
variants of the Gift Exchange Game by Fehr et al. [1997]; Lost Wallet Game by
Dufwenberg and Gneezy [2000] and Charness et al. [2007]; Moonlighting Game
by Abbink et al. [2000].
Some recent papers develop models which can explain puzzling behavior
through taking into account the interaction between extrinsic incentives5 and
intrinsic motivation6, which can lead, for instance, to motivation crowding-out.
2However, Kube et al. [2006] found support for negative reciprocity and question positive
reciprocity, especially in the long-run. Gneezy and List [2006] found reciprocity in short-run
(the first 2 hours of work) and decreasing reciprocity in the long-run: to the end of the 6-
hours job the subjects with more generous wage didn’t work harder that the others. Some
studies question the relevance of the lab experiments - see, e.g. List [2007], Hennig-Schmidt
et al. [2005], List and Levitt [2005]. We should be warned by these studies but evidence for
reciprocity comes from many different sources, so it’s hard to question that reciprocity is an
important psychological characteristic of human beings.
3In the various Dictator Game experiments, the subjects are endowed with a sum of money.
They decide then on how much of this windfall endowment to give to a stranger. More than
half of the subjects give between 20% and 50% of the endowment.
4Precisely, ”intrinsic reciprocity”, not ”consequentialism” or ”strategic reciprocity”.
5The list of extrinsic motivators is not limited to the incentive payments (piece-rate wage or
bonus payment) but includes also expectation of future material payoff e.g. reputation building
due to long-term interaction, strategic reciprocity, career concerns, comparative performance
based payment (tournaments), monitoring/control etc.
6The literature provides evidence for many kinds of intrinsic motivation, apart from al-
truism and reciprocity. The Ultimatum Game introduced by Gu¨th et al. [1982] illustrates
that taste for fairness and/or inequality aversion is an important factor determining behavior;
another evidence for fairness comes from different versions of the Gift Exchange Game - see
Fehr et al. [1993], Fehr and Falk [1999]. Social norms (avoiding social disapproval/geting
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My paper does the similar, though it is based on a different mechanism. I show
that reciprocal altruism itself can account for many systematically observed
behavior patterns given a natural information structure.
Levine [1998] developed the model in which Agent’s altruism is conditional
on the Principal’s one and applied it to explain behavior observed in a number
of lab experiments, for instance the Ultimatum Game and the Public Good
contribution game.
Falk and Fischbacher [2006] develop a theory of reciprocity based on psy-
chological games, i.e. with utilities of the actors depending not only on their
material payoffs, but also on the perceived intentions of another player, i.e. on
the 1-st and 2-nd order beliefs, following Rabin [1993]. The players’ concern
about the equitable outcome plays an important role in the analysis, in con-
trast with my model, which is based on reciprocal altruism. The model of Falk
and Fischbacher [2006] can explain behavior in the Ultimatum Game, the Gift
Exchange Game and some other experiments.
Ellingsen and Johannesson [2008] build a model which can account for the
crowding-out effect. It is similar to mine in that they consider altruistic actors.
One difference is that they also incorporate the taste for the social esteem (pride)
in the utility function, i.e. second order belief. Another difference is that the
actors in their model are unconditionally altruistic.
Sliwka [2007] develops a model which can also account for the crowding-
out effect through a mechanism based on social norms, which is different from
mine. There are reliable and unreliable Agents in the model. The reliable Agents
follow the contract whereas the unreliable ones can deviate even if a contract
is signed. As a consequence, the incentive scheme has to be high-powered for
the unreliable Agents to perform at a high level. This leads to the fact that
observing the high-powered incentive scheme, the Agent can learn that there
is a social norm to be unreliable which can crowd-out his intrinsic motivation
based on inherent reliability.
In a recent paper Dur [2008] analyzes a model based on reciprocal altruism,
applied to the workplace relation and shows the importance of attention payed
to the Agent by the Principal. The model follows Levine [1998] approach.
My paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Core Model and
presents its general analysis, leading to the benchmark results. Section 3 ana-
lyzes in detail signaling under reciprocal altruism without any extrinsic incen-
tives, i.e. the Core Model. Section 4 introduces the extrinsic incentives in the
Core Model and deals with two altered versions of it, which match the settings
of the well known lab experiments - the Trust Game with a possibility of a fine
by Fehr and Rockenbach [2003] and the ”Control Game” by Falk and Kosfeld
[2006]. I show that there is a unifying framework for the Core Model and its
two extensions with the same mechanism of motivation crowding out. Section
5 concludes.
social approval) influence economic decisions. People can change their behavior under peer
pressure or have a taste for the social embeddedness. The evidence are provided by a variant
of the Gift Exchange Game in Ga¨chter and Falk [2002] and Third Party Punishment Game
by Fehr and Fischbacher [2004]. A person may have taste for the others’ belief about his
motivation (or type) - see Rabin [1993], Falk and Fischbacher [2006] and Be´nabou and Tirole
[2006a]. The list of intrinsic motivators can be continued with self-learning, working on inter-
esting/challenging task (in this case effort may not be costly (painfull), the job rather gives
fun and higher effort increases utility) etc.
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2 The Core Model
Consider the Principal-Agent relation with one employer - the Principal and one
worker - the Agent. Assume that the Principal is altruistic towards the Agent
and the Agent reciprocates the employer’s altruism: if the Agent perceives the
Principal to care about him, he becomes altruistic towards the Principal. The
Principal offers a contract to the Agent.
Assume that output is equal to effort so that there is no moral hazard. The
output is observable and verifiable and can be contracted upon.
Producing output is costly with cost function C(q) satisfying standard as-
sumptions - convexity and zero cost at zero output:
C′(q) > 0, C′′(q) > 0 for q > 0
C(0) = 0, C′(0) = 0
Let B be the Agent’s benefit from interacting with the Principal. The benefit
can be psychological or a monetary payment from a third party7.
For now, assume that the Agent doesn’t respond to monetary incentives,
beyond some subsistence level, that we normalize to zero. In the Core model
analysis, we focus on the intrinsic motivation only. In the subsequent section,
I introduce extrinsic incentives. The selfish utilities of the Principal and the
Agent are then given by
v = q
u = B − C(q)
Let α be the degree of the Principal’s altruism, α̂ - the Agent’s perception
of the Principal’s altruism, and β be the intensity of the Agent’s reciprocity
(more generally, it can be treated as intensity of intrinsic motivation of any
nature emerging from perceiving the Principal as ”generous”). I assume that
0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1. The interaction term α̂β represents the Agent’s altruism emerging
as a result of reciprocating altruism of the Principal.
The utilities of the Principal and the Agent when the Agent produces output
q are given by
V (q, α) = v + αu = q + α(B − C(q)) (1)
U(q, α̂, β) = u+ α̂βv = B − C(q) + α̂βq (2)
The contract can be a command - ”produce q” or can give the Agent some
flexibility - say, ”produce any quantity q ∈ [q1, q2]”.
Notice the difference with the standard Principal-Agent setup. The Princi-
pal’s valuation of the output is not always increasing, now it has an inverted-U
shape: it increases for small enough values of output only and is maximal at
q = qP . Similarly, the Agent’s payoff is not always decreasing in output, and
has an inverted-U shape: it decreases only for large enough values and reaches
the maximal value at qA.
In what follows, I will refer to qP and qA as the Principal’s and the Agent’s
preferred values of output (or performance). In contrast with the standard
Principal-Agent models, qP 6= +∞, qA 6= 0. Principal’s and Agent’s payoffs as
functions of output are depicted in Figure 1.
7The latter is the case in the lab experiments which I consider in the paper. The third
party will be an experimenter.
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Figure 1: Principal’s and Agent’s payoffs under reciprocal altruism.
For α = β = 1 the Principal’s and the Agent’s interests are aligned, U(q) ≡
V (q), because there is full internalization, so that the two curves representing
the Principal’s and the Agent’s utilities in Figure 1 coincide.
For smaller values of α or β, i.e. weaker internalization, there is a conflict of
interest like in the standard Principal-Agent setup but this conflict is softened
by the partial internalization of utilities. In the graph, the two inverted-U curves
become more distant, and consequently, the distance between the maximizers
of the Principal and Agent utilities qP and qA becomes larger: the Principal
wants the Agent to exert more effort whereas the Agent prefers performing less.
For α and β close to 1 the Agent’s participation constraint is not binding
because qP is ”close enough” to the maximizer of the Agent’s utility qA where
the Agent utility is positive. However, as α or β decrease, the participation
constraint becomes binding.
Denote the value of q starting from which the participation constraint is bind-
ing by q0(α, β). I will refer to this value as the Agent’s participation threshold.
2.1 Benchmark cases
The preferred value of output for the Principal is given by
qP (α) = argmax
q
[V (q, α)] = argmax
q
[q − αC(q)]
C′(qP ) =
1
α
(3)
If there are no barriers to implement this output level, such as Agent’s partici-
pation constraint or limits on contract design, the Principal will induce it.
Lemma 1. The Principal’s preferred output qP (α) is determined by (3) and is
a decreasing function of α: ∂q
P
∂α
< 0.
The lemma follows directly from (3).
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The preferred value of output for the Agent is given by
qA(α̂, β) = argmax
q
[U(q; α̂, β)] = argmax
q
[α̂βq − C(q)]
C′(qA) = α̂β (4)
This is output which is realized if the Agent is given full flexibility or if this
level is available to the Agent despite some restrictions such as binding contract
are imposed.
This equation shows that the Agent is willing to perform at an effort level
such that his marginal cost is equal to his marginal benefit α̂β. This justifies
that α̂β can be considered as a measure of the Agent’s intrinsic motivation.
Lemma 2. The Agent’s preferred output qA(α̂, β) is determined by (4) and qA
increases with α and β: ∂q
A
∂α̂
> 0, ∂q
A
∂β
> 0.
The lemma follows directly from (4).
For the case α, β < 1 it’s easy to see from (3) that C′(qP ) > 1, whereas (4)
leads to C′(qA) < 1, so that qP > qA and there is always a gap between the
Principal’s and the Agent’s preferred output levels which is larger for smaller α
and β.
This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The Principal’s preferred output is always larger than the Agent’s
preferred output except for the case of α = β = 1 when the preferred outputs are
the same:
qP (α) > qA(α, β) if α < 1 or β < 1
qP (α = 1) = qA(α = 1, β = 1)
For the case of symmetric or revealed information, so that α̂ = α, the gap qP−qA
between the Principal’s and the Agent’s preferred outputs is a decreasing function
of α, β:
∂(qP−qA)
∂α
< 0,
∂(qP−qA)
∂β
< 0
The Agent’s participation threshold q0 is the unique root of the equation
U(q; α̂, β) = B + α̂βq − C(q) = 0 (5)
The root exists and is unique since U(0) = B > 0, U(q) increases for q ∈ (0, qA),
so that U(qA) > 0, then decreases for q ∈ (qA,∞) and U(q)→ −∞ as q →∞.
Because of continuity of U(q), there exists a unique q0 ∈ (qA,∞) such that
U(q0) = 0.
Lemma 4. The Agent’s participation threshold is given by q0(α̂, β) which is an
increasing function of α̂ and β: ∂q
0
∂α̂
> 0, ∂q
0
∂β
> 0
The lemma is easy to obtain from (5).
I proceed now with the asymmetric information case analysis.
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3 Signaling under Reciprocal Altruism
Consider the case when the Principal’s altruism parameter α is her private
information and the rest is symmetrically known.
The timing is as follows:
1. Principal learns α.
2. Principal offers a contract8: a command, i.e. specifies the output q.
3. Agent accepts or rejects the contract.
4. Contract is implemented and payoffs are realized.
So, we have a signaling game with common values.
To make exposition even simpler, I consider the 2-type case and then gen-
eralize the result to the continuum-type case.
Even though the formal setting of the signaling game should be clear for
most of the readers, I provide its formal description in the next subsection, in
which some notation is introduced. I proceed then to the analysis of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria and refinement.
Readers who are not interested in the technical details can skip the technical
subsection 3.1 and jump to 3.2 where the outcome of the signaling game as
predicted by the refined equilibrium is described.
3.1 Signaling with 2 types
There are 2 players - Principal (sender) and Agent (receiver).
The Principal’s type is her private information. Denote by A the set of the
possible types, A = {αH , αL}. The prior distribution is given by
α =
{
αH with prob. Π
αL with prob. 1−Π
(6)
The set of actions for the Principal9 is Q = [0,+∞). The set of actions for
the Agent is A = [0, 1] with a ∈ A be the probability of acceptance of an offer
made by the Principal.
A pure strategy of the Principal is a type-contingent q ∈ Q, i.e. qH for αH
type and qL for αL-type.
A pure strategy of the Agent is an acceptance rule a(·). The value a(q) ∈
[0, 1] is the probability of accepting the offer q. The set of Agent’s pure strategies
F is the set of all mappings from Q to [0, 1].
A mixed strategy of the Principal is a probability distribution over Q con-
ditional on type, σ(·|α). Clearly her mixed strategy can be represented by the
two probability distributions over Q: (σH(·),σL(·)).
A mixed strategy of the Agent is a probability distribution10 τ over F . The
resulting mapping is still a mapping from Q to [0, 1]. So, the mixed strategy of
the Agent, denoted by aτ (·), is still an element of F . I will will restrict attention
to the pure strategies of the Agent.
8The contract is the take-it-or-leave-it offer.
9Actually, this set of actions can be reduced to [0, q0H ].
10There is an issue of measurability over the space of functions.
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The Agent’s ex-post belief on the Principal’s type distribution µ(·) is
µ(q) = Prob(α = αH |q)
There is one-to-one correspondence between Agent’s belief µ(q) and Agent’s
ex-post expectation on the Principal’s altruism
α̂(q) = µ(q)αH + (1− µ(q))αL (7)
which is paralleled in the Agent’s ex-post expected payoff11
Uµ(q, a;β) = U(q, a, α̂;β)
The pure strategies-beliefs profile is thus ((qH , qL), a(·), µ(·)). The mixed
strategies-belief profile is ((σH(·), σL(·)), a(·), µ(·)).
The payoffs in the game for the pure strategies profile ((qL, qH), a(·)) are
V (q, a(·), α) = V (q, α)a(q) = (q − αC(q) + αB)a(q)
U(q, a(·), α;β) = U(q, α;β)a(q) = (B − C(q) + αβq)a(q)
which parallel (1) and (2).
The payoffs for the mixed strategies can be determined in a standard way.
Denote by qPH and q
P
L the preferred output of the high and low altruistic Prin-
cipals correspondingly. Formally, qPH = q
P (αH), q
P
L = q
P (αL). From lemma 1
we have
qPH < q
P
L (8)
Intuitively, the Principal who cares more about the Agent wants him to
work less. Intuitively, since marginal cost of effort increases and the Principal
partially internalizes this cost, the one with stronger internalization prefers to
have lower marginal cost C′(q) because marginal benefit from output is constant
(equal to 1).
Denote by q0H and q
0
L the Agent participation thresholds when he learns that
the Principal type is αH and αL correspondingly. Formally, q
0
H = q
0(αH , β),
q0L = q
0(αL, β).
Denote the participation threshold when there is no update on the Principal’s
type by q0E :
q0E = q
0(Eα, β)
where
Eα = ΠαH + (1−Π)αL
According to Lemma 4,
q0L < q
0
E < q
0
H . (9)
Intuitively, if the Principal’s type is revealed to the Agent, then he is willing
to exert more effort for those Principal who cares more about him. This is
natural since the worker internalizes the benefits from output and intensity
of the internalization is higher for the worker connected with more altruistic
Principal.
11It is easy to see that Uµ(q, a(·); β) = µ(q)(B−C(q)+αHβq))a(q)+(1−µ(q))(B −C(q)+
αLβq))a(q) = (B + α̂βq − C(q))a(q).
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3.1.1 The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
As is standard in the signaling games, the set of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
(PBE) is large. In this part of the paper I characterize the structure of any PBE
and proceed to refinement in section 3.1.2.
Consider a PBE of the signaling game. I will denote the equilibrium (pure)
offers of the Principal of type αH (αL) by q
∗
H (q
∗
L), the equilibrium acceptance
rule of the Agent by a∗(·). The belief supporting the equilibrium is µ∗(·). So,
the pure strategies-belief equilibrium profile is ((q∗H , q
∗
L), a
∗(·);µ∗(·)). Similarly,
the mixed strategies-belief equilibrium profile is ((σ∗H(·), σ
∗
L(·)), a
∗(·);µ∗(·)).
Denote by BRµ(q) the best response acceptance rule for the Agent with
ex-post belief µ(·):
BRµ(q) = argmax
a∈[0,1]
Uµ(q, a;β) (10)
For a given offer q the Agent calculates the value µ(q) according to his belief
and solves the maximization program (10), which picks the value a(q) for the
acceptance rule a(·) at point q only. The Best Response doesn’t impose any
restriction on values a(q˜) for q˜ 6= q.
Lemma 5. For any belief µ(·), the Best Response acceptance rule is a threshold
with the threshold value
q̂(q) = q0(α̂(q), β) (11)
BRµ(q) =

1 if q < q̂(q)
0 if q > q̂(q)
any a ∈ [0, 1] if q = q̂(q)
where α̂(q) is given by (7)
For any belief µ(·) and any offer q
q0L ≤ q̂(q) ≤ q
0
H (12)
so that for any Best Response acceptance rule, the Agent accepts at least offers
q < q0L and rejects any offer q > q
0
H .
Corollary 1. The equilibrium acceptance rule a∗(·) is a threshold with threshold
value given by (11)
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Now I proceed to the analysis of the Principal equilibrium offer.
First, I prove the monotonicity Lemma which is based on the standard re-
vealed preferences argument.
Lemma 6. For any q∗L ∈ supp σ
∗
L, q
∗
H ∈ supp σ
∗
H holds
C(q∗H)a
∗(q∗H) ≤ C(q
∗
L)a
∗(q∗L)
In a PBE12 such that a∗(q∗H) = 1 holds
q∗H ≤ q
∗
L
12a∗(q∗H) = 1 will follow from (32) for ”most” of the equilibria. It will follow from Lemma
9 that q∗H ≤ q
∗
L even if a
∗(q∗H) < 1. We need to study the structure of the equilibria in more
details to prove that q∗H < q
∗
L holds in almost any PBE.
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Proof is given in the Appendix.
Next, I show that if an equilibrium has a pooling part, it can consist of only
one offer.
Lemma 7. If supp σ∗H ∩ supp σ
∗
L 6= ∅ then there is only one common point in
the supports of the equilibrium mixed strategies for the two types:
supp σ∗H ∩ supp σ
∗
L =
{
q∗p
}
Proof is given in the Appendix.
The two Lemmas 6 and 7 show that any PBE has a very particular structure:
there can be a pooling part - an offer q∗p made by both types of the Principal,
and a separating part - the offers made only by αH -type lying to the left of q
∗
p,
and the offers made only by αL-type to the right of q
∗
p. Put formally,
q∗H < q
∗
p < q
∗
L (13)
for any q∗H ∈ supp σ
∗
H \ supp σ
∗
L, q
∗
L ∈ supp σ
∗
L \ supp σ
∗
H if the corresponding
elements of an equilibrium exist.
I will distinguish between
• pooling equilibria - equilibria with supp σ∗H = supp σ
∗
L,
• semi-separating equilibria13 - equilibria with supp σ∗H 6= supp σ
∗
L and
supp σ∗H ∩ supp σ
∗
L 6= ∅
• separating equilibria, for which supp σ∗H ∩ supp σ
∗
L = ∅.
Following lemma characterizes the set of pooling equilibria.
Lemma 8. The pooling equilibria always exists. In any pooling equilibrium there
is only one offer q∗p made by both Principal types: supp σ
∗
H = supp σ
∗
L = {q
∗
p}.
The offer q∗p is a pooling equilibrium offer iff q
∗
p ≤ q
0
E
Acceptance rule necessary satisfies14
a∗(q∗p) =
{
1 if q∗p < q
0
E
any a ∈ [0, 1] if q∗p = q
0
E
and belief necessary satisfies µ∗(q∗p) = Π.
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Figure 3 below illustrates the set of pooling equilibria.
I turn now to the separating and semi-separating equilibria.
For the further analysis the relative position of qPH , q
P
L , q
0
L, q
0
E is important.
It is partially described by (8) and (9). More precise characterization can be
obtained by inspecting Figure 2. The formal statement is as follows.
Proposition 1. There exist thresholds β3 < β2 < β1 determined by
β1 is solution to q
0(αL, β) = q
P
L
β2 is solution to q
0(αL, β) = q
P
H
β3 is solution to q
0(Eα, β) = qPH
13Semi-separating equilibria are often called ”hybrid” in the literature.
14Additional requirements should be imposed on the acceptance rule for the offers q 6= q∗
to ensure that the two types of Principal don’t have profitable deviations.
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Figure 2: The relative position of qPH , q
P
L , q
0
L, q
0
E
such that
q0L < q
P
H for β < β2
qPH < q
0
L for β > β2
The thresholds βj are important to describe the equilibria structure and
properties.
For the analysis of the separating and semi-separating equilibria the crucial
is the relative position of qPH and q
0
L, i.e. whether β > β2 or β < β2.
The following lemma characterizes the structure of the semi-separating and
separating equilibria of the signaling game.
Lemma 9. The separating equilibria always exist.
For β ≥ β2 ⇔ q
0
L ≤ q
P
H the supports of the equilibrium offers consist of
only one offer
supp σ∗j = {q
∗
j }, j = L,H
and
q∗H < q
∗
L = q
0
L, a
∗(q∗H) = 1, a
∗(q∗L) < 1
For β < β2 ⇔ q
P
H < q
0
L the supports of the equilibrium offers can consist of
one or two offers.
The semi-separating equilibria always exist.
For β ≤ β2 ⇔ q
0
L ≤ q
P
H they can have one of the two structures:
q∗H < q
∗
p , a
∗(q∗H) = 1, a
∗(q∗p) ≤ 1
q∗p < q
∗
L = q
0
L, a
∗(q∗p) = 1, a
∗(q∗L) < 1
For β > β2 ⇔ q
P
H < q
0
L they can also have the third structure
q∗H < q
∗
p < q
∗
L, a
∗(q∗H) = a
∗(q∗p) = 1, a
∗(q∗L) ≤ 1
11
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q0L
Figure 3: Pooling equilibria
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Now we have obtained the structure of the set of PBE of the signaling game
in great details. Figure 3 represents the set of all the pooling equilibria. For
each β any point from the shadow area represents a pooling equilibrium offer.
q
β
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
L
H
H
H
L
H
H
L
L
β2 1
qPH
qPL
q0E
q0L
Figure 4: Separating equilibria
Figure 4 represents the set of the separating equilibria and shows some typ-
ical cases, as described by Lemma 9.
The figure shows three equilibrium offers profiles corresponding to the three
different values of β. The triangles represents the equilibrium offers and the
labels show which type makes which offer.
In the left-most equilibrium, αL-type offers q
∗
L = q
0
L which is accepted with
probability a∗
(
q0L
)
< 1. The αH -type makes an offer q
∗
H < q
0
L which is ac-
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cepted with probability 1. If a∗
(
q0L
)
is not too low and q∗H isn’t too small, this
configuration is incentive compatible and constitutes an equilibrium.
For the equilibrium in the middle of the figure, αH -type is indifferent between
the two offers, one of which is higher and another is lower than qPH ; αL-type
makes only one offer. All the equilibrium offers are accepted with probability
1. All the other offers are rejected, according to the acceptance rule15.
Finally, in the right-most equilibrium both types use mixed offers with 2-
points support.
q
β
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
L
HL
H
HL
H
HL
L
β2 1
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qPL
q0E
q0L
Figure 5: Semiseparating equilibria
Figure 5 represents the set of the semi-separating equilibria.
The multiplicity of equilibria is the consequence of no restrictions on the
acceptance rule for the out-of-equilibrium offers. For example, consider the
right-most equilibrium of figure 5. Notice that the Principals’ preferred offers
qPj are below q
0
L which means that it is in the Agent’s interest to accept these
offers would they be proposed. However, since they are out of equilibrium, there
is no rationality restrictions for the sequential continuation subgames moves
started when these offers are made. Consequently, these offers can be rejected
(or accepted with low probability) in the equilibrium acceptance rule. In this
way the equilibrium is sustained to make deviation to these offers unprofitable
for the Principal. However, such acceptance rule is ”unreasonable” and the
outcome of the game predicted by this equilibrium can hardly appear.
Equilibrium refinement is a standard procedure for the signaling games which
allows to eliminate ”unreasonable” equilibria.
15Of course, if the out-of-equilibrium offers are accepted with low enough probabilities, such
profile can also constitute an equilibrium.
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3.1.2 Equilibrium Refinement
I use the intuitive criterion16 proposed by Cho and Kreps [1987]. I show that
only one PBE satisfies the criterion for β > β2. The intuitive criterion also
eliminates some equilibria for the case β < β2, though there is still a continuum
of equilibria satisfying it. I will argue then that one of them is ”the most
reasonable” by applying stronger refinement.
Some notation is needed to implement the intuitive criterion, following Cho
and Kreps [1987]. Let ν(A′|q) be the ex-post probability which the Agent assigns
to the (sub)set A′ of the Principal’s type after observing an offer q. For the two-
type case A′ can be {αH}, {αL} or A = {αH , αL}.
Formally,
ν(A′|q) = µ(q)I{αH∈A′} + (1− µ(q))I{αL∈A′}
Let
BR(A′, q) =
⋃
µ: ν(A′|q)=1
BRµ(q)
be the set of all reasonable acceptance rules for beliefs concentrated on the
(sub)set A′ applied to the offer q would it be proposed. The acceptance rule is
”reasonable” if it is a Best Response corresponding to some beliefs concentrated
on the (sub)set A′.
Fix an equilibrium profile ((σ∗H(·), σ
∗
L(·)), a
∗(·);µ∗(·)). Denote the equilib-
rium payoff of αj-type Principal by V
∗
j = V (q
∗
j , a
∗(q∗j ), αj) for some
17 q∗j ∈ supp σ
∗
j .
Let J(q) be the set of types which for sure don’t want to deviate to q for
any reasonable acceptance rule:
J(q) =
{
αj : V
∗
j > max
a∈BR(A,q)
V (q, a, αj)
}
The set A \ J(q) then is the set of Principal’s types which for sure want to
deviate from an equilibrium and make an offer q provided that some reasonable
acceptance rule will be applied.
The equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion if
V ∗j ≥ min
a∈BR(A\J(q),q)
V (q, a, αj) for all j, q (14)
The following Proposition states the main result of the formal analysis of
the signaling game.
Proposition 2. For the case β > β2
(
⇔ qPH < q
0
L
)
the only equilibrium out-
come satisfying the intuitive criterion is the outcome with
q∗H = q
P
H , q
∗
L = min
{
q0L, q
P
L
}
so that the separating equilibrium emerges.
For the case of β ≤ β2
(
⇔ q0L ≤ q
P
H
)
only the pooling equilibria with
q0L ≤ q
∗
p ≤ q
0
E
satisfy the intuitive criterion.
16A survey of the refinements procedures and approaches can be found in Fudenberg and
Tirole [1991].
17Clearly, for any q∗j ∈ supp σ
∗
j , V (q
∗
j , a
∗(q∗j ), αj) takes the same value, so the definition of
V ∗j is correct.
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Proof is given in the Appendix.
After applying the intuitive criterion we have obtained a unique prediction
for the signaling game outcome for β > β2
(
⇔ qPH < q
0
L
)
. However, for the case
of β ≤ β2
(
⇔ q0L ≤ q
P
H
)
there are still many pooling equilibria, though fewer than
in the set of PBE. It can be shown that they can’t be eliminated by applying
Criterion D1 or NWBR criteria.
The reason for multiplicity of the pooling equilibria satisfying the intuitive
criterion is that the equilibrium payoff for the Principal is compared in (14)
with the worst (for the Principal) reasonable acceptance rule based on Agent’s
belief concentrated on the set A = {αH , αL}. In the worst case, after observing
a deviation to q > q∗HL the Agent believes that this deviation is done by αL-
type. Then, any offer q > q0L is reasonably rejected and the intuitive criterion
(14) is satisfied for PBE offers q∗p > q
0
L since any upward deviation from q
∗
p is
reasonably rejected.
However, once such upward deviation is profitable for both types, the intu-
itive criterion can be strengthened by comparing the equilibrium payoff in (14)
with payoff obtained under ”more reasonable” acceptance rule which is based
on the ex-ante belief instead of the worst belief. Then, in the right-hand side
of (14) the acceptance rule applied to deviations q > q∗HL is the Best Response
acceptance rule based on belief µ(q) = Π, so that any q < q0E (not only q < q
0
L)
is accepted. This rules out all the PBE with q < q0E .
For an equilibrium offer q∗p = q
0
E the Agent is indifferent between accepting
and rejecting (and between any probability of accepting), but for the acceptance
rule satisfying the strengthened intuitive criterion, all the offers just below q0E
are accepted with probability 1, so if a∗(q0E) < 1, then there will be profitable
deviation for any Principal to q0E − ε. Consequently, only a
∗(q0E) = 1 is possible
in a (refined) equilibrium.
The strengthening of the intuitive criterion in this way is equivalent to re-
quiring the acceptance rule to be sequentially rational on the out-of-equilibrium
path. It is also equivalent to eliminating the weakly dominated acceptance rules.
As a result, only equilibrium with the offer q∗p = q
0
E for β ≤ β3 satisfies the
strengthened intuitive criterion. For β3 < β < β2 the strengthened criterion
also leads to the unique prediction for the game outcome q∗p = q
P
H . Indeed, this
offer is feasible, and αH -type prefers to make it. By deviating to a higher offer,
αL-type would be revealed and then the deviating offer would be rejected, so
αL-type has to pool on q
P
H .
It’s easy to check that the unique separating equilibrium for β > β2 which
satisfies the intuitive criterion satisfies the strengthened criterion as well.
3.2 The 2-type Signaling Game Outcome
The intuitive criterion gives a unique prediction of the game outcome for the case
of separating equilibrium, which emerges for β > β2. For β ≤ β2 any equilibrium
satisfying the intuitive criterion is pooling, and the unique prediction for the
outcome is obtained with the strengthened intuitive criterion, which selects
the Pareto-dominating outcome. The unique (refined) equilibrium outcome is
presented by Figure Figure 6 for the case when all the thresholds βj are less
than 1. When some of the thresholds βj ar greater than 1, they should be cut
to 1.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium in the signaling game
For the rest of the discussion I call αL-type the ”tough” Principal and αH -
type - the ”generous” Principal. Consider an intuitive explanation for the sig-
naling game outcome.
When the Agent is highly reciprocal, β ∈ (β1, 1], he can be intrinsically mo-
tivated even by tough Principal and agrees to perform at her preferred level qPL ,
which is quite high, because the Agent’s participation constraint isn’t very tight.
In this case, the tough Principal will reveal her type by requiring performance
at this high level.
However, as the Agent’s reciprocity declines, his intrinsic motivation de-
creases, and the tough Principal can’t inspire the Agent to perform at the level
qPL and has to follow the Agent participation constraint by offering contract
with q < qPL , still revealing her type for β ∈ (β2, β1). The Agent gets zero social
utility in this case.
For even lower reciprocity intensity, the Agent’s intrinsic motivation is not
enough to make him exert effort higher than qPH if he would learn that the
Principal is tough. In this case, the tough Principal follows the offer of the
generous Principal, in other words, she has to mimic the generous Principal.
The Agent can’t distinguish the two types of the Principal and his participation
threshold becomes being based on the expected value of the Principal altruism
Eα > αL so that q = q
P
H breaks even. The generous Principal doesn’t want to
separate since she gets her preferred output qPH . The Agent’s expected utility
is positive. This is the case for β ∈ (β3, β2).
Finally, when the Agent’s reciprocity intensity is very low so that the Agent
doesn’t have enough intrinsic motivation to exert effort qPH , both types of Prin-
cipal follow the Agent’s participation threshold for the expected value of the
Principal’s altruism Eα, not revealing the type. Neither type of the Principal
has an incentive to deviate and reveal his type. This is the case for β ∈ (0, β3).
To conclude the description of the outcome, I stress that in the 2-type sig-
naling game the tough Principal doesn’t want to mimic the generous one unless
she has to, because mimicking will result in lower output which is not desirable
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for the tough Principal. However, the Agent is (intrinsically) motivated to ac-
cept an offer if it isn’t too high. As a result, if the Agent’s intrinsic motivation
isn’t high enough - due to low intensity of reciprocity or due to revealed low
altruism of the tough Principal, the tough Principal has to follow the Agent’s
participation threshold or the generous Principal’s offer.
3.3 Signaling with Continuum of Types
The analysis for 2 types can be generalized to the case of a continuum of types.
I don’t present the complete analysis, as for the 2-type case and rather focus
on the ”most reasonable” equilibrium18, which leads to the unique prediction of
the signaling game outcome.
Let the Principal’s altruism parameter α be distributed on the interval
[α1, α2] ⊂ [0, 1] with continuous CDF F (α).
The interval’s bounds α1 and α2 are the exact bounds of the distribution:
α1 = inf{α|F (α) > 0}, α2 = sup{α|F (α) < 1}.
Let α× be the solution to
q0
(
α×, β
)
= qP
(
α×
)
which always exists19 and is unique since the left-hand side is increasing and
the right-hand side is decreasing function of α - see Figure 7.
The next property follows directly from the definition of α×.
Claim 1. The Principal’s preferred output qP is feasible, i.e. satisfies the
Agent’s participation constraint iff α ≥ α×.
So, the population of the Principals can be separated into two sub-populations.
One consists of comparatively generous ones with α ≥ α×, which can inspire the
Agent’s intrinsic motivation high enough to implement their preferred output
qP , would their altruism be revealed. Another subpopulation consists of com-
paratively tough Principals with α < α×, which can not inspire high enough
Agent’s intrinsic motivation.
Denote by
Eα˜[α] = E[α|α < α˜]
the expected value of the truncated distribution of Principal’s altruism param-
eter, bounded at the top by α˜.
The signaling game outcome in the ”most reasonable” equilibrium is char-
acterized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. 1. If α is distributed inside the interval [α×, 1], then all
the Principals implement their preferred output in the ”most reasonable”
equilibrium, i.e. the equilibrium contract is
q = qP (α)
2. If α1 < α
× and
q0 (Eα, β) > qP (α2) (15)
18See the refinement section for the 2-type case for the discussion of the ”most reasonable”
equilibrium.
19The fact that it can be that α× > 1 is not a problem.
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then there exists α˜ ∈ [α×, α2] determined as solution to
q˜0 ≡ q0 (Eα˜[α], β) = q
P (Eα˜[α]) (16)
such that the ”most reasonable” equilibrium contract is given by
q =
{
qP (α, β) for α > α˜
q˜0 for α ≤ α˜
where q˜0 is determined by (16).
3. If the inequality (15) doesn’t hold20, then the ”most reasonable” equilib-
rium contract is full pooling with
q = q0 (Eα, β)
Proof is given in the Appendix.
q
α
q0
qA
qP
α× α2α1
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u u u u
Figure 7: Equilibrium in signaling game. Case 1
Figure 7 illustrates the equilibrium contract for the case when ex-ante all the
Principals in the population are highly-altruistic, i.e. α ≥ α× and can inspire
the Agent to perform at their preferred level (point 1 of the Proposition).
Figure 8 illustrates the case when there are both generous and tough Prin-
cipals, i.e. with altruism greater and smaller than α×, but there are enough
Principals with high altruism (point 2 of the proposition). In this case only
a part of the Principals’ subpopulation with α > α×, for instance those with
α ≥ α̂ implement their preferred performance level qP .
20This implies α1 < α×.
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Figure 8: Equilibrium in signaling game. Case 2
The first case from Proposition 3 emerges for high β. As β decreases, the
equilibrium structure switches to the one described at point 2 of the Proposition
and then to the one of point 3.
Similarly to the 2-type case, when the Agent is highly reciprocal, the sepa-
rating equilibrium in which all the Principals implement their preferred output
emerges. For lower levels of reciprocity, the equilibrium structure shifts to pool-
ing and a larger share of Principals can’t implement their preferred performance
level.
3.4 Application to the Organization Design
For the 2-type framework, the generous Principal implements her preferred out-
put for β ∈ [β3, 1]. In this case she cares neither about the altruism level of
the tough Principals αL, nor about the structure of the Principals’ population
characterized by Π.
However, if β ∈ [0, β3), the generous Principal can’t implement her preferred
output in the emerging pooling equilibrium. In this case she is affected by the
adverse effect which emerges due to the very existence of the tough Principals
in the population.
Such adverse effect is present for the continuum-type framework as well. In
particular, for the case illustrated by Figure 8, the Principals with α ∈ [α×, α˜)
are affected. For the case, described in point 3 of Proposition 3, the whole
generous subpopulation with α ∈ [α×, α2] is affected.
Even a part of the ”tough” Principals with α < α× is affected as they get
output lower than the Agent’s participation threshold would the Principals’ type
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be revealed. For the case depicted by Figure 8, these have α ∈ (Eα̂[α], α
×]; for
the case of point 3 of Proposition 3 these have α ∈ (Eα,α×].
In both frameworks - the 2-type and the continuum-type,
• the most altruistic Principals (among the generous ones) are less likely to
be affected,
• if Agent’s reciprocity is high, then all the concerned Principals are less
likely to be affected,
• if tough Principals are not too tough or if they represent a smaller share in
the population (so that the expected altruism level in the whole population
is high enough), then all the concerned Principals are less likely to be
affected.
This means that the most generous Principals care to a lesser extent about
the environment in which they operate. For the Principals which are generous
but not the most generous ones, the environment can play an important role
for their ability to elicit a high performance level and they prefer to be in the
environment of the generous Principals and highly reciprocal Agents.
The counterpart of the adverse effect is an advantageous effect for the tough
Principals which emerges due to the very existence of the generous Principals
in the population. In the 2-type framework, for the case of β ∈ [0, β2) the
tough Principal gets an output which exceeds the Agent’s participation thresh-
old would the type of the tough Principals be revealed. In the continuum-type
framework, some Principals benefit from the same advantage: for the case de-
picted by Figure 8, these are ones with α ∈ [α1, Eα˜[α]), for the case depicted by
Figure ??, these are ones with α ∈ [α1, Eα]. The advantageous effect appears
when the tough Principal can mimic to be the generous ones (or when these
more generous can’t separate from the tougher ones).
As a result, the tough Principals prefer having highly reciprocal Agents and
if this is not the case - then to be in the environment of the generous Principals
to benefit from the advantageous effect in the pooling equilibrium.
Now let us take a point of view of an organization designer. Assume that
he has a choice - whether to create an organizations of type A in which the
Principals’ population is mixed, or create an organization of type B in which
the generous and tough Principals are separated. The organization designer
informs in this way the Agents about the Principal’s altruism (the information
can still be imprecise).
For instance, in the 2-type framework, the organization designer can separate
the two types, in the continuum-type framework, the designer can separate the
Principals with α > α× from those below the threshold α×.
An interesting question is how the choice of organization type influences the
overall performance in the organization?
Clearly, in organizations of type A the generous Principals will implement
lower output, whereas in the organizations of type B the generous Principals will
get higher output. This shows that if separation emerges as a result of signaling
(endogenously), the tough Principals implement higher output; if separation is
exogenous then the relation between the outputs implemented by the tough and
generous Principals is reversed.
Figure 9 illustrates exogenous Principals’ separation compared to the en-
dogenous Principals’ population for the continuum-type framework.
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Figure 9: Application to the organization design. The effect of exogenous sep-
aration of the Principals’ population
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4 Application to the Experiments
In this section I introduce extrinsic incentives in the Core Model. The modified
versions of the Core model are applied to the analysis of human behavior in
the settings of two well known lab experiments - the Trust Game of Fehr and
Rockenbach [2003] and the Control Game21 by Falk and Kosfeld [2006], which
are described in detail below.
Under the selfishness assumption, which is standard in (neoclassical) con-
tract theory, the results of the experiments are puzzling whereas the reciprocal
altruism framework allows to account for the behavior observed in the lab, for
instance the motivation crowding out. This also shows the potential of the
modeling approach based on reciprocal altruism and provides an additional jus-
tification for the relevance of contracting models based on reciprocal altruism.
4.1 Trust Game
Consider the Trust Game (or Investment Game) in its Fehr and Rockenbach
[2003] version. In their experiment, both the Principal and the Agent are en-
dowed with S = 10 units of money. First, the Principal decides on x - how much
money to send to the Agent and also announces q̂ - the desired back-transfer.
The desired back-transfer isn’t binding for the Agent. The experimenter triples
the sum of money sent by the Principal22, so that the Agent receives 3x. The
Agent then decides on the back-transfer q. This setting represents the Baseline
treatment. Notice that q̂ is a ”cheap talk” in this case.
In the Incentive treatment the Principal on top of x and q̂ announces a fine
f which is imposed on the Agent if the back-transfer is lower than the desired
level q̂, so that q̂ is no more a ”cheap talk”. The fine isn’t paid to the Principal,
it simply reduces the Agent’s payoff, in other words the fine is a punishment for
the Agent. The fine amount is exogenous (set by the experimenter), so that the
only decision of the Principal is to choose whether to impose the fine or not.
The contract is now (x, q̂, f) where f can take only two values 0 or f .
The paper brings evidence of crowding-out effect, i.e. the situation in which
the use of the extrinsic motivator (fine for bad performance) decreases the in-
trinsic motivation and, as a result, leads to a lower performance. The study
finds that, on average, in the incentive treatment the back-payment is higher
when the fine is set to zero (the Principal chooses not to punish) than for the
case of punishing (f = f). This means that imposing (extrinsic) incentive leads
to a lower performance, which is puzzling from the point of view of ”standard”
contract theory.
The utilities of the Principal and the Agent in the experimental setting are
21I follow Ellingsen and Johannesson [2008] in calling the game of Falk and Kosfeld [2006]
the ”Control Game”.
22This explains why the game can also be called the ”Investment Game”. The transfer x
can be thought of as an investment, 3x - as a return to the investment.
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given, following the reciprocal altruism framework23 by
V = 10− x+ q + α(10 + 3x− C(q) − fIq<q̂)
U = 10 + 3x− C(q)− fIq<q̂ + α̂β (10− x+ q)
Let the decision on x has already been made and focus on the continuation
subgame24 in which the Principal decides on q̂ and f and then the Agent decides
on q. We can consider x as a constant at this point. Dropping x and other
constants in the payoff functions leads to the following simplified expressions
for the payoffs:
V = q − α(C(q) + fIq<q̂) (17)
U = α̂βq − C(q) − fIq<q̂ (18)
In the absence of a fine, the Principal’s preferred back-transfer qP (α) is
determined, as in (3) for the Core Model by
C′(qP ) =
1
α
In the absence of the fine, the back-transfer preferred by the Agent qA(α̂, β)
is determined by
C′(qA) = α̂β
as in (4) for the Core model.
Consider the following setting.
Let the Principals and the Agents be heterogenous - some of them are
pro-social, others are selfish. I denote the type of the Principal by θP , and
the type of the Agent by θA. For both - the Principals and the Agents,
θj ∈ {Social, Selfish}. The type is the private information.
The pro-social actors are characterized by altruism αH and reciprocity in-
tensity βH , the selfish ones - by the pair (αL, βL). I assume that
αH > αL, βH > βL, 0 ≤ αj , βj ≤ 1
To simplify the analysis, I assume25 that βL = 0.
Assume that the actors are drawn from the same population, in which the
share of the pro-social actors Prob(θ = Social) is unknown. By observing own
type, the actors update the belief on the partner’s type. I assume that the prob-
ability, assigned by the pro-social Principal to be matched with the pro-social
Agent piH is higher than the probability piL, assigned by the selfish Principal to
the same event:
piH = Prob(θ
A = Social|θP = Social) = Prob(β = βH |α = αH) (19)
piL = Prob(θ
A = Social|θP = Selfish) = Prob(β = βH |α = αL) (20)
23In the experiment monetary cost of paying back is linear: Cm(q) = q. I assume that there
is also a psychological cost of paying back Cψ(q) which assumed to be convex, so that the
overall cost C(q) = Cm(q) +Cψ(q) is convex. This assumption is admittedly ad hoc, but it is
needed to capture the predominance of non bang-bang behavior.
24Of course, x itself is a signal of the Principal’s altruism, but I assume that the Agent
updates his belief on the Principal’s altruism after observing x which brings the belief at the
beginning of the subgame.
25The more general setting with the four possible pairs (αk , βl) and without requiring
βL = 0 can be considered. This, however, leads to more tedious computations but doesn’t
bring additional intuition. So, I restrict attention to the simpler setting.
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In other words, I assume that people tend to treat the others as similar to
themselves. Such a difference in beliefs can result from the rational projection
bias26.
The Principal moves first and doesn’t know the type of the Agent with whom
she is matched. The Agent, on the contrary, observes the action of the Prin-
cipal, and can use this to learn about the Principal’s type. Because of this, I
assume that behavior of the Principal is driven by her (unconditional) altru-
ism27, whereas the behavior of the Agent is driven by his reciprocity. In other
words, only altruism α affects the Principal’s behavior, and only reciprocity in-
tensity β, interacted with the belief on the Principal’s type α̂ - for the Agent’s.
This setting brings us to the following signaling game with the two-sided
asymmetric information.
The Principal can be of type θP ∈ {Social, Selfish}, or, equivalently, α ∈
{αH , αL}. The Agent can be of two types, θ
A ∈ {Social, Selfish}, or, equiva-
lently, β ∈ {βH , βL}.
The Principal’s strategy is a type-contingent pair (fj , q̂j) ∈ {0, f}× [0,+∞),
j = L,H (where the index L is used for the selfish type, and H indexes for the
pro-social type).
The Agent’s strategy is a type-contingent back-transfer conditional on the
Principal’s action qi(f, q̂) ∈ [0,+∞), i = L,H .
The Principal has ex-post belief on the probabilities to be matched with the
pro-social Agent which depends on the Principal’s type:
The Agent’s ex-post belief µ is determined by the Principal’s observed action,
µ(f, q̂) = Prob(α = αH |f, q̂). As for the Core Model, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between belief µ and the ex-post expectation of the Principal’s
type α̂: α̂ = µαH + (1 − µ)αL, so that α̂ can be considered instead of µ. The
payoffs are given by (17) and (18).
26Rational projections bias can be determined as ”the tendency to look at others (other
people or future selves) from the point of view of ones current self” - see Tirole [2002]. For the
evidence and implication of the projection bias to ”future selves” see, e.g., Loewenstein et al.
[2003]. Be´nabou and Tirole [2006b] discus the implication of the projection bias for collective
belief.
Rational projection bias can be endogeneized in the following way. Assume that the share of
the pro-social actors in the population is unknown. It can be either Πg or Πb, depending on
the state of the world - ”Good” or ”Bad”. Assume that Πg > Πb. The state of the world
is not observed; however the prior probabilities of the two states are commonly known and
equal to pg and pb = 1− pg respectively.
By observing her own type and using the Bayesian rule, the Principal obtains probabilities to
be matched with the pro-social Agent:
piH = Πg
pgΠg
pgΠg + pbΠb
+Πb
pbΠb
pgΠg + pbΠb
=
pgΠ2g + pbΠ
2
b
pgΠg + pbΠb
piL = Πg
pg(1 −Πg)
pg(1 −Πg) + pb(1− Πb)
+ Πb
pb(1− Πb)
pg(1− Πg) + pb(1− Πb)
=
=
pgΠg(1− Πg) + pbΠb(1− Πb)
pg(1− Πg) + pb(1 −Πb)
The objective probability for the Agent to be pro-social is pi = Prob(θA = Social) = pgΠg +
pbΠb. Clearly, piL < pi < piH .
27Alternatively, one can assume that given the prior belief on the Agent’s altruism, the
Principal’s altruism is equal to the sum of her pure (unconditional) altruism αp and reciprocal
altruism αr = βE[αA]. This results in the Principal’s altruism towards the Agent at the level
αH = αpH + βHE[α
A] or αL = αpL + βLE[α
A], depending on the type of the Principal.
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I consider the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which Agent’s belief off the
equilibrium path are ”reasonable”, as in the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps.
There is an important difference with the Core model. Now the choice of
the fine f plays crucial role in signaling.
The setting described above corresponds to the Incentive Treatment. For
the Baseline Treatment the fine f is exogenously set to zero.
I proceed now backward in the analysis of the game.
Consider the Agent’s Best Response back-transfer for the different treat-
ments of the experiment. The Agent’s participation threshold isn’t relevant
since paying back zero is feasible.
Claim 2. In the Trust Game, if the Agent holds beliefs α̂ on the Principal’s
altruism, the Best Response back-transfer q is:
1. in the baseline treatment (fine isn’t possible) and in the incentive treatment
when the Principal chooses not to punish (f = 0): q = qA(α̂, β).
2. in the incentive treatment when the Principal chooses to impose a fine
(f = f):
q =

qA(α̂, β) if q̂ < qA(α̂, β)
q̂ if qA(α̂, β) < q̂ < q˜A(α̂, β)
qA(α̂) if q̂ > q˜A(α̂, β)
where q˜A(α̂, β) is determined by (see figure 10)
α̂βqA − C(qA)− f = α̂βq˜A − C(q˜A), q˜A > qA
and q˜A(α̂, β) is an increasing function of α̂.
U
q
f
qA q˜A
Figure 10: Agent’s payoff
Proof is given in the Appendix.
It follows from the Claim that, contrary to the predictions of the standard
contract theory, when extrinsic incentives are used for the intrinsically motivated
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qˆq
qA q˜A
qA
q > qˆ
q = qˆ
q < qˆ
Figure 11: Back-transfer as a function of threshold
Agent, the actual back transfer can be higher, equal or lower than the desirable
back-transfer, as illustrated by Figure 11.
If q̂ < qA, the required performance is low compared to the intrinsic motiva-
tion, so the Agent is willing to perform better than he is asked for. For q̂ = qA
the intrinsic motivation is just enough to motivate the Agent for the required
level of performance. Finally, q̂ > qA corresponds to the case when intrinsic
motivation isn’t enough to inspire the Agent for high enough performance.
Not surprisingly, for a given belief α̂ holds q˜A(α̂) > qA(α̂), which means that
under symmetric (or revealed) information, if extrinsic incentive is added to the
intrinsic motivation, the performance level is higher. So, the fine serves as a
”positive reinforcer” in the sense of Be´nabou and Tirole [2003].
When the threat of the fine is imposed, the Agent has to give up some utility
and faces a trade-off: whether to diverge from his preferred back-payment qA to
the desired back-payment q̂ or to pay a fine but not diverging from his preferred
back-payment qA. The value q˜A separates the Agent’s preferred option: if the
desired back-payment is below this value, the Agent prefers to diverge from qA
to q̂, if the desired back-transfer is higher than q˜A, the Agent prefers to disobey
and pay the fine. So, q > q˜A can’t be implemented with a threat of fine.
Denote by
qij = q
A(αi, βj)
the maximal back-transfer which can be implemented by using intrinsic mo-
tivation only, given that the Agent with β = βj holds belief α̂ = αi. These
back-transfers are determined by C′(qij) = αiβj . Since βL = 0,
qHL = qLL = 0
Denote by
q˜ij = q˜
A(αi, βj)
the maximal back-transfer which can be implemented by using both intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation, i.e. by imposing the (threat of) fine, given that the
Agent with β = βj holds belief α̂ = αi. It follows from Claim 2 that
C(q˜LL) = f (21)
Now I show that under some restrictions on the parameters, the game has
the separating equilibrium with crowding-out.
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Proposition 4. There is a range of parameters (αL, αH , βH , f, piL, piH) for
which there exists unique separating equilibrium satisfying the Cho-Kreps intu-
itive criterion. This equilibrium is characterized by crowding-out in the Agent’s
performance.
In particular, the parameters should be such that
qLH ≤ q˜LL, q˜LH ≤ qHH , piH ≥ piH , piL ≤ piL
where
piH =
q˜LL − αHC(q˜LL)
qHH − αHC(qHH )
≤ 1 (22)
piL =
q˜LL − αLC(q˜LL)
qHH − αLC(qHH )
≥ 0 (23)
In the equilibrium αH-type imposes no (threat of) fine, αL-type imposes
(threat of) fine:
f∗L = f, f
∗
H = 0
The desired back-transfers are: q̂∗L = q˜LL, any q̂
∗
H ≤ qHH .
In particular, it is possible to have
q̂∗L > q̂
∗
H
The actual back-transfers are
q∗LL = q˜LL, q
∗
LH = q˜LL, q
∗
p = 0, q
∗
HH = qHH
where q∗ij is the equilibrium back-transfer to the αi-Principal from βj-Agent.
The average back-transfer to the pro-social Principal is higher than that to
the selfish one:
piq∗HH ≥ q
∗
LL
Proof is given in the Appendix.
The proposition states that in the separating equilibrium, the pro-social
Principal chooses not to impose the fine, i.e. not to use the extrinsic incentive,
signaling in this way her generosity and inspiring high intrinsic motivation of the
pro-social Agents. They perform at a comparatively high level qHH . If the pro-
social Principal meets the selfish Agent, which can’t be intrinsically motivated,
the performance will be zero: qLL = 0, since there are no extrinsic incentives.
Imposing the fine, i.e. using the extrinsic incentive, crowds out the intrin-
sic motivation of the pro-social Agent because this signals low altruism of the
Principal. However, provision of the extrinsic incentive guarantees performance
of all Agents28 at a comparatively low level q˜LL. This can lead to the observed
crowding out in the Agent’s performance: the average for the lottery between
qHH and qLL = 0 is higher than q˜LL for some values of the parameters.
The rational projection bias is crucial to guarantee the no-mimicking (in-
centive compatibility) condition. The Principals have different beliefs on the
Agent’s type, for instance, the pro-social Principal is more optimistic. Because
of this, the pro-social Principal prefers the lottery between high qHH and zero,
28The pro-social Agents could perform at the level qLH , if qLH > q˜LL. This, however, ruled
out by the Proposition assumption.
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whereas the selfish Principal prefers the comparatively low but sure outcome29
q˜LL.
Let us now discuss the conditions for the separating crowding out equilibrium
to emerge, described in proposition 4. The condition qLH ≤ q˜LL is equivalent
to C(qLH) ≤ C(q˜LL). Since C(q˜LL) = f - see (21), this means that f should be
high enough:
f ≥ f1 ≡ C(qLH)
The back-transfer q˜LH is determined, according to Claim 2 by
αLβHqLH − C(qLH)− f = αLβH q˜LH − C(q˜LH)
where q˜LH is chosen on the decreasing part of the graph of the function
F (q) = αLβHq − C(q) (see Figure 10). Consequently, q˜LH ≤ qHH is equivalent
to
αLβHqLH − C(qLH)− f ≥ αLβHqHH − C(qHH)
which can be rewritten as
f ≤ f2 ≡ (αLβHqLH − C(qLH))− (αLβHqHH − C(qHH ))
So, f shouldn’t be very high.
The conditions piH ≥ piH and piL ≤ piL with the thresholds given by (22)
and (23), show that the projection bias should be large enough to ensure no-
mimicking.
On the other hand, if piL and piH are fixed, the threshold conditions piH ≥ piH
and piL ≤ piL can require additional restrictions on f .
For instance, if f = 0, then q˜LL = 0, and piLL = 0. So, condition (23) imposes
some restriction f ≥ f ′1. Similarly, (23) imposes some restriction f ≤ f
′
2.
The following corollary from the proposition 4, providing a more construc-
tive description of the parameters under which the crowding-out separating
equilibrium emerges, can be established.
Corollary 2. For a generic triple (αL, αH , βH) and quadratic cost function
C(q) = c2q
2 there always exists a non-empty set of the parameters (piL, piH , f)
such that there exists a separating equilibrium with crowding-out.
These parameters satisfy to (22) and (23) and the inequality f1 ≤ f ≤ f2.
If cost isn’t quadratic, the additional condition
αLαHβ
2
H
(
qLH
αLβH
−
qHH
αHβH
)
≤ C(qLH)
is required.
Proof is given in the Appendix.
29This reasoning can also be applied if the Principals and the Agents are drawn from the two
independent distribution, so that there is no projection bias, but the Principals are risk-averse.
So, the separating equilibrium with crowding-out can also emerge in such setting.
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4.2 The Control Game
In the experiment conducted in Falk and Kosfeld [2006] the Principal chooses
whether to restrict the set of Agent’s effort from below. Output is assumed to
be equal to effort.
Put formally, the Principal offers a contract q which can take two values - 0
or q, where the latter is exogenously set by the experimenter. The Agent then
chooses effort q ∈ [q,∞). Effort is costly for the Agent. The Agent has an initial
endowment of 120.
The experiment has a number of findings which can not be explained within
the selfishness framework. For instance, the Agents, proposed a contract q >
0, exert, on average, less effort, than those with q = 0, which means that
extrinsic incentive (control) has a negative impact on Agents’ performance. This
represents the hidden cost of control effect. The observed behavior of the Agents
was heterogenous: there was observed positive, negative and neutral reaction to
control. Finally, many Principals choose not to control.
The reciprocal altruism framework accounts for these experimental findings.
As for the Trust Game, I alter the Core Model to match the experiment
design.
The selfish utilities of the Principal and the Agent are given by30
v = q
u = 120− C(q)
The reciprocal altruism framework leads to the (social) utilities
V = q + α(120− C(q))
U = 120− C(q) + α̂βq
The initial endowment of the Agent allows to disregard the Agent’s partici-
pation constraint. By dropping the constants, the Principal and Agent utilities
can be simplified to
V = q − αC(q) (24)
U = α̂βq − C(q) (25)
Denote by qA(α̂, β) the Agent’s preferred effort level:
qA = argmax
q
[U(q;α)] = argmax
q
[α̂βq − C(q)]
C′(qA) = α̂β
as for the core model.
Consider the setting with heterogenous Principals and Agents, adopted in
the analysis of the Trust Game in subsection 4.1.
The Principal’s strategy is a type-contingent choice of control q
i
∈ {0, q},
i = L,H . The Agent’s strategy is a type-contingent effort, conditional on the
Principal’s action qj(q) ∈ [q,+∞), j = L,H .
30The experiment sets C(q) = q/2. As for the Trust Game, I assume that C(q) is convex.
See footnote 23 for the justification of the assumption.
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The Principal’s ex-post belief on the probabilities to be matched with the
pro-social Agent depends on the Principal’s type and are given by (19) and
(20). The Agent’s ex-post belief is determined by the Principal’s observed ac-
tion, µ(q) = Prob(α = αH |q). As for the Core Model, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between belief µ and the ex-post expectation of the Principal’s
type α̂: α̂ = µαH + (1 − µ)αL, so that α̂ can be considered instead of µ. The
payoffs are given by (24) and (25).
As in the analysis of the Trust game, I consider the Perfect Bayesian equi-
librium, in which Agent’s belief off the equilibrium path are ”reasonable” in the
sense of the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps.
I proceed backwards in the analysis of the game.
Consider first the Agent’s Best Response choice of effort.
Claim 3. If qA(α̂, β) ≥ q then the Agent’s Best Response is q = qA(α̂, β);
otherwise it is q = q.
The Claim is evident as it simply says that the Agent chooses the global
maximizer of his utility whenever it’s feasible. Otherwise, he chooses the closest
feasible effort which is equal to q - the lower bound of the set of feasible efforts.
Denote by qij the effort, voluntarily exerted by the Agent with βj which
beliefs that the Principal’s type is αi, i.e. qij = q
A(αi, βj) and C
′(qij) = αiβj .
Consider now the Principal’s decision. If the Principal with altruism αi
holds belief pii to be matched with the pro-social Agent, which, in turn, holds
the true belief on the Principal’s type, then under no-control her utility is31
V = pii(qiH − αiC(qiH)) (26)
Under control, if effort qiH is available, i.e. qiH ≥ q, and the Principal’s
utility is still given by (26). If qiH < q, then the effort q = q is implemented
and the Principal’s utility is
V = (q − αiC(q)) (27)
Denote by qC1i < q
C2
i the two roots of the equation (see Figure 12)
pii(qiH − αiC(qiH)) = (q − αiC(q))
Comparing the Principal’s utility for the case when the Agent holds the true
belief on the Principal’s type, given by (26) and (27), leads to the following
characterization of the Principal’s Best Response in this case:
Claim 4. If the Agent holds the true belief on the Principal’s type, then the
Principal’s Best Response is:
q =
{
q if q ≤ qC2i
0 if q ≥ qC2i
Consider now the case when the Principal’s type is her private information.
31qiL = 0 since βL = 0.
30
VqqiH qC2iq
C1
i
piiVi(qiH)
Vi(qiH)
Figure 12: Principal’s utility
Proposition 5. For each q < qHH , (αL, αH , βH) there exists a range of pa-
rameters (piL, piH) such that there exists the unique separating equilibrium of the
Control Game, satisfying the intuitive criterion. There is crowding-out in effort
in the equilibrium.
The parameters should be such that
piL ≤ piL, piH ≥ piH
where for the case q ≥ qLH
piL =
q − αLC(q)
qHH − αLC(qHH )
> 0
piH =
q − αHC(q)
qHH − αHC(qHH )
< 1
for the case q < qLH
piL =
q − αLC(q)
[qHH − αLC(qHH)] + [q − αLC(q)]− [qLH − αLC(qLH)]
> 0
piH =
q − αHC(q)
[qHH − αHC(qHH)] + [q − αHC(q)]− [qLH − αHC(qLH)]
< 1
In the equilibrium, the pro-social Principal doesn’t control, whereas the selfish
Principal does:
q∗
H
= 0, q∗
L
= q
The Agent’s performance
q∗HH = qHH , q
∗
p = 0, q
∗
LH = max{qLH , q}, q
∗
LL = q
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where q∗ij is the equilibrium back-transfer to the αi-Principal from the βj-Agent.
The average effort to the pro-social Principal is higher than that to the selfish
one.
Proof is given in the Appendix.
The mechanism of emerging of the separating equilibrium with crowding-out
is similar to that of the Trust Game. By choosing not to control, the pro-social
Principal signals her kindness, and this inspires high intrinsic motivation for the
pro-social Agent. Because of this, when matched with the pro-social Principal,
the pro-social Agent exerts high effort qHH . However, the selfish Agent doesn’t
react to the signal of the Principal’s generosity and, once not controlled, exerts
zero effort.
The selfish Principal chooses to control and guarantees the (comparatively
low) output q. However, even selfish Principal inspires the pro-social Agent’s
intrinsic motivation, so effort from the pro-social Agent can be qLH , if it’s higher
than the controlling threshold q.
The lottery between qHH and 0 effort is differently treated by the two Prin-
cipals. The pro-social one is more optimistic, and beliefs that the chance to get
qHH is higher, compared to the belief of the selfish Principal. Because of this,
no-mimicking holds - the pro-social Principal prefers lottery, whereas the selfish
Principal prefers the sure outcome.
As for the Trust Game, the separating crowding-out equilibrium emerges
when the available extrinsic incentive isn’t too weak nor too strong.
I turn now to the more detailed description of other equilibrium structures
of the Control Game.
Proposition 6. For given αL, αH , βH , piL, piH , there exist the threshold values
qi, qi < qj for i < j, such that the equilibrium in the Control Game is:
1. No-control pooling for q ∈ [0, q1], which represents no effect of control;
2. Separating equilibrium with crowding-out for q ∈ [q2, q3] (hidden cost of
control);
3. Control pooling for q ∈ [q3, q4] (positive effect of control);
4. Separating with no crowding-out in effort q ∈ [q4, q5] (positive effect of
control);
5. No-control pooling q ∈ [q6,+∞).
For q ∈ [q1, q2] and q ∈ [q5, q6] an equilibrium involves mixed strategies.
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Figure 13 illustrates the proposition.
The experiment finds that for small q the hidden cost of control effect is
stronger compared to large q. The model is in line with this result. In fact,
the hidden cost of control is obtained for q ∈ [q2, q3]; for larger q, the pooling
equilibrium with control emerges which means that the increase in q will lead
to the increase in average performance (which is equal to q). For even larger q
the separating equilibrium in which the controlling Principal gets larger output
than the non-controlling one, so there is also the positive effect of control rather
than the hidden cost.
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Vq
q − αLC(q)
q − αHC(q)
piL(qEH − αLC(qEH))
piL([qHH−αLC(qHH)]−[qLH−αLC(qLH)])
1−piL
piH(qHH − αHC(qHH ))
q1q2 q3 q4 q5q6
Figure 13: Equilibrium structure in the Control Game
The experiment finds strong heterogeneity between the Agents and that
there are Agents which react positively, neutrally or negatively to control. The
heterogeneity of the Agents is assumed in the model, and the reaction of the
Agents is predicted. Controlling the pro-social Agents can lead to the decrease
in his performance. For instance, for q ∈ [q2, q3] when the crowding-out equilib-
rium emerges, the controlled pro-social Agent performs at q = q, whereas the
uncontrolled at q = qHH > q. Controlling the selfish Agent leads to the increase
in his performance for q ∈ [q2, q5]. Controlling the pro-social Agents also leads
to the increase in their performance for the control pooling equilibria. Finally,
the neutral effect of control can emerge in the game but out of equilibrium path.
According to Claim 3, if Agent’s preferred output qA is higher than control, the
Agent will perform at level qA independently on whether he is controlled or
not. In particular, for the case of weak control (q is small enough), even if the
pro-social Agent is controlled, he can choose to perform at a higher level.
The experiment finds that for larger q, the larger share of the Principals
chooses to control. This is also the prediction of the model: for small q none
of the Principals controls which results in the no-control pooling equilibrium;
for larger values of q the hidden cost of control equilibrium emerges in which
only the selfish Principals control; for even larger values of q the control pooling
equilibrium emerges in which both types of Principal choose to control.
4.3 A Unifying Framework
The three models considered above - the Core model and its two modifications
with a possibility to use an extrinsic motivator have a lot in common and can
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be unified in the following way.
First, all of them represent a signaling game.
At stage 1, the Principal sends a message - fixes Q̂ - the set of feasible
performance levels for the Agent. Performance is costly for the Agent. At stage
2, the Agent decides whether to comply or disobey. In case of compliance, the
Agent chooses an element q ∈ Q̂ - the implemented performance level. In case
of disobeying, the Agent chooses a disobedience option in a set of disobedience
options32
◦
Q:
◦
q ∈
◦
Q.
For the Core Model Q̂ = {q} - the required output level, compliance corre-
sponds to agreement to perform at level q (a(q) = 1), disobeying corresponds
to
◦
q = 0 or, equivalently, to a(q) = 0. For the Trust Game the performance
set is Q̂ = [q̂,+∞), compliance corresponds to the choice of some back-transfer
q ∈ [q̂,+∞), disobeying corresponds to the choice of
◦
q < q̂, in the equilibrium
with disobedience
◦
q = qA. Finally, for the Control game Q̂ = (q,+∞), compli-
ance means the choice of effort higher than the minimal requirement, disobeying
is the choice of effort at the minimal level:
◦
q = q.
Second, all of the three models are based on the reciprocal altruism frame-
work. This means that the Agent is intrinsically motivated but there is a gap
between the Principal’s preferred performance level and that of the Agent. The
Agent prefers the lower performance.
The weaker the Principal’s altruism (i.e. the less generous she is), the larger
is the gap, the more the Principal suffers from leaving the Agent too much
flexibility, i.e. not restricting at all or imposing only slight restrictions on the
performance set Q̂. Consequently, it’s in the Principal’s interest (especially, the
tough Principal) to make a strict offer - i.e. to restrict the Agent’s performance
set Q̂ to avoid a large deviation from her preferred performance level. On the
other hand, offering a slightly restricted or non restricted at all, compared to
◦
Q,
performance set Q̂ is a generous offer, which is likely to be made by the highly
altruistic Principal.
By offering a generous performance set Q̂, the Principal can signal her gen-
erosity. By learning the Principal’s generosity, the Agent becomes inspired for
better performance, i.e. intrinsically motivated. An extrinsic motivator, added
to the intrinsic motivation, leads to even better performance for the symmetric
information on the Principal’s generosity. However, for the case of asymmetric
information, the use of an extrinsic motivator signals the non-generosity of the
Principal (for the case of separating equilibrium) and crowds out the Agent’s
intrinsic motivation.
Such a crowding mechanism influences the Agent’s performance for the Trust
Game and for the Control game - performance for the tough Principal can be
lower than for the generous one, despite the low performance is feasible for the
performance set, proposed by the highly altruistic Principal.
The motivation crowding out is presented in the Core model as well, though
it doesn’t result in the crowding-out on performance, because the signaling
of generosity goes through offering the performance level itself, not the (non-
trivial) set of the performance levels, as in the Trust and Control games.
32The set of performance levels can be considered as a subset of the disobedience options:
Q̂ ⊂
◦
Q. Alternatively, the set of disobedience options can be considered as a set of all possible
Agent’s actions.
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In the Core model, the Agent attached to the generous Principal gets higher
utility from an interaction. Indeed, he is intrinsically motivated for high perfor-
mance (the participation threshold is high) but is asked for lower performance,
and, consequently, gets positive utility. The Agent attached to the tough Prin-
cipal gets positive utility only for the separating equilibria with β ∈ (β1, 1] -
see Figure 6. For β ∈ (β2, β1] the Agent performs at his participation threshold
and gets zero utility, for β ≤ β2 the Agent gets negative utility in the pooling
equilibria.
Another common feature of the Trust and the Control games is the effect of
the strength of an extrinsic motivator. If it is weak, not using it can not signal
the Principal’s generosity. In fact, in the Control Game if the threshold q is
small, it is not used by both types33 and has no effect at the performance level.
In the Trust Game, if the fine f is small, it is used by both types (the two lines
qA and q̂A are close to each other so that pooling with both types imposing the
fine emerges).34
If the available extrinsic motivator is strong enough but not too strong and
Agent’s reciprocity intensity is high enough, the generous Principal can signal
her generosity by not using the extrinsic motivator. The tough Principal prefers
to reveal her type and to crowd out the Agent’s intrinsic motivation in this
way because she gets better performance by using the extrinsic motivator and
compensating in this way the crowding out of the intrinsic motivation.
Finally, if the available extrinsic motivator is very strong, both types can
benefit form using it. The generous Principal crowds out the intrinsic motivation
to the pooling level but gets compensated through high additional extrinsic
motivation of the Agent.
5 Conclusion
My paper contributes to the literature on the theory of incentives which goes
beyond the neoclassical framework and takes into account social components
of preferences - reciprocity, fairness, social norms etc. In particular, I build a
simple and intuitive model of reciprocal altruism and show its relevance for the
behavioral patterns systematically observed both in the lab and in the field.
The modeling approach can be used for the analysis of the workplace relation.
The model predicts that crowding-out in performance can emerge as the
equilibrium outcome for some values of parameters of the model. The crowding-
out in performance is the situation in which imposing an extrinsic incentive
decreases the intrinsic motivation and leads to a lower performance - the phe-
nomena well known in human resources management. It can also be the case
(for some other values of parameters) that crowding-out in incentives doesn’t
result in crowding-out in performance.
This paper is among a few others studies aimed at enriching the theory of
incentives by taking into account intrinsic motivation. Further research can
be devoted to considering other information structures - Agents can differ in
productivity, the organization can have more complicated structure than only
33Alternatively, it can be used by both types - see case I of proposition 5.
34Only the Control game experiment provides an evidence supporting the reciprocal altruism
model. There were no variation of the size of the extrinsic incentive, i.e. the fine, in the Trust
Game experiment.
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one Principal and only one Agent. Considering other social components of
preferences, supported by the evidence from lab and field (negative reciprocity,
concerns for equity etc.) can also be relevant in building the theory of incentives.
Finally, I don’t claim that monetary incentives are not important. On the
contrary, it is well known that the incentive payments play an important role
in creating incentives - see e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont [2005] or Prendergast
[1999]. However, there is growing evidence that workers are motivated to exert
effort not only by the incentive payment or other extrinsic motivators but also
by the intrinsic motivation. On top of this, the interaction between intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation can play an important role. The result of such inter-
action can be motivation crowding-out (or -in). Therefore, taking into account
the intrinsic motivation in the labor contract models should give better under-
standing of the workplace relation. Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives
should be considered as complements rather than substitutes in the modeling.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5
According to (10), for any Best Response acceptance rule a(·) holds
a(q) ∈ argmax
a∈[0,1]
(B − C(q) + α̂(q)βq) a
The solution to this program is easy to find. If, for some q, B − C(q) + α̂(q)βq > 0
then a(q) = 1, if B − C(q) + α̂(q)βq < 0, then a(q) = 0 for the corresponding
values of q, finally, if B − C(q) + α̂(q)βq = 0, then any a is a solution .
According to lemma 4, the participation constraint B − C(q) + α̂(q)βq > 0
is equivalent to the threshold q < q0(α̂(q), β). This gives the characterization
of the Best Response rule.
Since µ(q) ∈ [0, 1], then αL ≤ α̂(q) ≤ αH , consequently, according to mono-
tonicity of the function q0(α, β) with respect to its first argument (see lemma
4) we obtain
q0(αL, β) ≤ q
0(α̂(q), β) ≤ q0(αH , β)
which can be rewritten as q0L ≤ q
0(α̂(q), β) ≤ q0H . This proofs (12).
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Since q∗j (j = L,H) are the elements of the Best Response of the Prin-
cipal, the two inequalities hold:
(q∗L − αLC(q
∗
L))a
∗(q∗L) ≥ (q
∗
H − αLC(q
∗
H))a
∗(q∗H)
(q∗H − αHC(q
∗
H))a
∗(q∗H) ≥ (q
∗
L − αHC(q
∗
L))a
∗(q∗L)
Summing them up gives
(αH − αL)(C(q
∗
L)a
∗(q∗L)− C(q
∗
H)a
∗(q∗H)) ≥ 0
which proves the first statement in the Lemma.
For the second claim of the Lemma, notice that if a∗(q∗H) = 1, then
C(q∗L) ≥ C(q
∗
L)a
∗(q∗L) ≥ C(q
∗
H)
which gives q∗L ≥ q
∗
H .
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Let q′, q′′ ∈ supp σ∗H and q
′, q′′ ∈ supp σ∗L are the two offers made by
both types in an equilibrium. Then, the two types should be indifferent between
the two offers:
(q′ − αHC(q
′))a∗(q′) = (q′′ − αHC(q
′′))a∗(q′′)
(q′ − αLC(q
′))a∗(q′) = (q′′ − αLC(q
′′))a∗(q′′)
This gives
αH(C(q
′′)a∗(q′′)− C(q′)a∗(q′)) = αL(C(q
′′)a∗(q′′)− C(q′)a∗(q′)) =
= q′′a∗(q′′)− q′a∗(q′) (28)
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The first equality gives C(q′′)a∗(q′′)− C(q′)a∗(q′) = 0. This, in turn, gives
a∗(q′′)
a∗(q′)
=
q′
q′′
=
C(q′)
C(q′′)
But the second part of this equality can’t hold for a convex function C(q) if
q′ 6= q′′. This finishes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. According to Lemma 7 the pooling offer q∗p should be unique.
The belief should be consistent on the equilibrium path which means that
µ∗(q∗p) = Π. This gives α̂(q
∗
p) = Π, according to (7). Thus, according to Lemma
5, the equilibrium acceptance rule a∗(·) should have a threshold q̂(q∗p) = q
0
E . So,
to have offer q∗p accepted, it is necessary to have q
∗
p ≤ q
0
E .
To prove sufficiency, note that any profile (q∗p , a
∗(·);µ∗(·)) with offer q∗p ≤ q
0
E ,
acceptance rule a∗(q∗p) = 1, a
∗(q) = 0 for any other q 6= q∗p supported by beliefs
µ∗(q∗p) = Π, µ
∗(q) = 0 for any other q 6= q∗p constitutes a PBE of the signaling
game.
Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. I start the proof with two general properties of the equilibrium offers’
supports.
The 2-point support property. The supports of equilibrium offer supp σ∗j
contains at most two offers for each j = L,H .
To prove this, notice that any q ∈ supp σ∗j should be Best Responses to the
acceptance rule and solve the program
max
q∈Q
V (q, αj) a
∗(q) (29)
If a∗(q) = 1 for all q ∈ supp σ∗j for some j, then all solutions of (29) should
solve the program
max
q∈Q
V (q, αj) (30)
However, it’s clear that a solution of the latter program can consist of at most
two points because of inverted-U shape of V (q).
In case of a∗(q) < 1 for some equilibrium offer q, it is necessary that q = q0L,
as follows from (33) and Lemma 5. Consider j such that q0L ∈ supp σ
∗
j . For all
the others equilibrium offers q˜ ∈ supp σj holds q˜ < q
0
L - see (31) and a
∗(q˜) = 1
and, consequently q˜ solves (29) and (30) as in the previous case and there can
be only two values q = q′(j), q′′(j) which solve (30) because of inverted-U shape
of V (q).
It is important now to notice that q′(j) < q0L, q
′′(j) > q0L. This follows from
(quasi-)convexity of V (q, ·). In fact, we have
V (q′(j), αj) = V (q
′′(j), αj) = V (q, αj)a
∗(q)
with a∗(q) < 1, which means that simultaneously hold V (q, αj) > V (q
′(j), αj)
and V (q, αj) > V (q
′′(j), αj). This, in turn, leads to q
′(j) < q < q′′(j) because of
convexity of V (q)
38
But q′′(j) can’t be an equilibrium offer since q′′(j) > q0L, consequently a
∗(q′′(j)) = 0
according to Lemma 5. So, if a∗
(
q0L
)
< 1 and q0L is an equilibrium offer for type
j then there can be at most one other equilibrium offer q′(j) for this j. This
finishes the proof of the 2-points support property.
The support bounds for the separating equilibria.35 For the separat-
ing equilibria holds
supp σ∗H ⊂ [0, q
0
L], supp σ
∗
L ⊂ [0, q
0
L] (31)
To prove this, notice that for any q∗L there should be µ
∗(q∗L) = 0, conse-
quently, to be accepted on the equilibrium path (at least with some probability,
otherwise the αL-Principal’s payoff will be zero), q
∗
L should satisfy q
∗
L ≤ q
0
L,
according to Lemma 5. This inequality together with (13) gives36
q∗H < q
∗
L ≤ q
0
L < q
0
H (32)
This gives (31).
This means, in particular, that37
a∗(q∗H) = 1 for any q
∗
H (33)
since q∗H < q
0
H , according to (32).
The separating equilibria.
The functions V (q, αj) are increasing in q for q ∈ [0, q
P
j ]. For the case
q0L ≤ q
P
H this means that both functions V (q, αj) are increasing in q on supp σ
∗
j ,
according to (31). So, if there are more than 1 offer q ∈ supp σ∗H ∪ supp σ
∗
L
such that a∗(q) = 1 then both types must choose the highest of these offers
to maximize payoff. Together with (33) this means that there is only one offer
{q = q∗H} = supp σ
∗
H . Then, there should necessary be q
∗
L = q
0
L because only
in this case it is possible to have a∗(q∗L) < 1 - see Lemma 5 which leads to
{q0L} = supp σ
∗
L. This proofs the first part of the Lemma.
For the case of q0L > q
P
H the functions V (q, αj) are no more monotone on
[0, q0L] and previous argument can’t be used. So, the one-point support property
doesn’t hold but the 2-points support is guaranteed.
The semi-separating equilibria.
The 2-points support property together with the monotonicity Lemma 6
suggest that only the following three structures of the separating and pooling
parts of the equilibria are possible:
q∗H < q
∗
p < q
∗
L, q
∗
H < q
∗
p, q
∗
p < q
∗
L
However, the first one isn’t possible for q0L ≤ q
P
H . To justify this, the same
argument as for the separating equilibria can be applied: since the function
V (q, αH) is increasing on [0, q
0
L] and a
∗(q∗H) = a
∗(q∗p) = 1 (it is possible to have
a∗(q∗L) < 1 only for the right-most point of the equilibrium offers), there is only
one offer in the support of the αH -type: {q = q
∗
H} = supp σ
∗
H . For the other
35it can be shown the property holds for the separating parts of the semi-separating equi-
libria.
36It is possible that some elements of the equilibrium are not presented, then we can have,
e.g. q∗H < q
∗
p ≤ q
0
L < q
0
H .
37Notice that we can guarantee that a∗(q) = 1 only for q ∈ supp σ∗H \ supp σ
∗
L.
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two configurations a∗(q) < 1, where q is the highest equilibrium offer, must hold
to avoid deviation of the αH -type to this highest offer.
This finishes the proof of the necessity part, i.e. I have shown that other
equilibrium structures are not possible. Existence is obvious.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The case β > β2 ⇔ q
P
H < q
0
L.
The idea is that in this case the αH -type preferred offer q
P
H is feasible, i.e.
should be accepted for any reasonable acceptance rule. Even offers higher than
qPH are feasible (in particular, can be feasible q
P
L ), and αL-type will be better
off by proposing one of them. So, reasonably, αH -type should make only here
preferred offer; αL-type should make here preferred offer q
P
L if it is feasible and
the highest feasible offer it qPL is not feasible.
Put formally, consider an equilibrium, pooling or (semi-)separating, with
qPH /∈ supp σ
∗
H (34)
and apply the intuitive criterion (14) with q = qPH , α = αH .
Notice that qPH is always accepted according to all Best Response acceptance
rules - see Lemma 5
a
(
qPH
)
= 1 for all a ∈ BR (A′, q) for any A′ ⊆ A
This leads to
V
(
qPH , a, αH
)
= V
(
qPH , αH
)
a
(
qPH
)
= V
(
qPH , αH
)
· 1 for all a ∈ BR(A′, q)
Then min
a∈BR(A′,q)
V
(
qPH , a, αH
)
doesn’t depend on a and
min
a∈BR(A′,q)
V
(
qPH , a, αH
)
= V
(
qPH , αH
)
which is the global maximum of V (q, αH).
Consequently, V ∗H < V
(
qPH , αH
)
and the intuitive criterion (14) can’t hold
given (34).
So, it is necessary for the refined equilibrium to have qPH ∈ supp σ
∗
H . More-
over, there can’t be any other offer in supp σ∗H .
Consider now an equilibrium with
min
{
qPL , q
0
L
}
/∈ supp σ∗L (35)
If qPL < q
0
L, apply the intuitive criterion (14) with q = q
P
L , α = αL. The same
argument as for qPH , αH applies. This leads to supp σ
∗
L = {q
∗
L}.
If q0L ≤ q
P
L and q
0
L /∈ supp σ
∗
L, apply (14) with q = q
∗
L + ε, α = αL.
Again, the same argument applies38 and leads to the conclusion that necessary
supp σ∗L = {q
0
L}.
Finally, if a∗
(
q0L
)
< 1 for q0L ∈ supp σ
∗
L, apply (14) with q = q
0
L−ε, α = αL.
This offer is always reasonably accepted and there exists ε small enough such
that V ∗L < V (q, a, αL) because V
∗
L = V (q
0
L, αL)a
∗(q0L) and V (q, a, αL) = V (q
0
L−
ε, αL) · 1. So, an equilibrium with a
∗
(
q0L
)
< 1 can’t pass the intuitive criterion.
38We can’t guarantee that a(q0L) = 1 yet, so deviation to q
0
L isn’t necessarily profitable
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The case β ≤ β2 ⇔ q
0
L ≤ q
P
H .
Notice that then q0L ≤ q
P
L and both functions V (q, αH) and V (q, αL) are
increasing on [0, q0L] in this case.
If equilibrium is pooling with q∗p < q
0
L, consider deviation to q = q
∗
p + ε with
small ε such that q < q0L. This offer q is accepted for any reasonable acceptance
rule and increases V for both types, consequently (14) doesn’t hold for such q
and any α.
Consider pooling equilibria with q∗p ≥ q
0
L. According to Lemma 8, q
∗
p ≤ q
0
E
holds for any pooling PBE.
Let q be a deviation such that q < q0E . Then
max
a∈BR(A,q)
V (q, a, αj) = V (q, αj) · 1
because at least for belief µ(q) = Π the offer q should be accepted for any
reasonable acceptance rule since q < q0E - see Lemma 5.
Notice also that
min
a∈BR(A′,q)
V (q, a, αj) = 0 for A
′ = {αL} or A
′ = A
min
a∈BR(A′,q)
V (q, a, αj) = V (q, αj) for A
′ = {αH}
because if belief are concentrated on the subset which contains αL, then belief
µ(q) = 0 is possible and any offer q > q0L (which is the case here) is rejected for
any reasonable acceptance rule, so the minimal value of V is zero. On the other
hand, if belief is concentrated on αH , i.e. µ(q) = 1, the offer q < q
0
H (which is
the case since q < q0E < q
0
H) is accepted.
So, the only possibility to have the intuitive criterion (14) violated is to have
A \ J(q) = {αH} and V
∗
H < V (q, αH). In other words, αH -type should be
”reasonably” revealed by deviation to q (see the definition of the set J(q)) and
this deviation should be profitable, i.e. q should be closer to qPH , compared to
the distance between q∗p and q
P
H .
Three cases are possible as illustrated by figure 14: 1) q∗p ≤ q
P
H ; 2) q
P
H <
q∗p ≤ q
P
L ; 3) q
∗
p > q
P
L .
For the case 1 the deviations to q < q∗p are not profitable; the deviations to
q > q∗p are profitable (at least for q < q
P
L ) but they are profitable for both types
or only for αL-type. The deviations to q > q
P
L can be profitable for αL-type
only. Consequently, any deviation to q > q∗p can’t reasonably reveal αH -type.
So, all the equilibrium from area 1 pass the intuitive criterion.
For the case 2 the deviation to q = qPH is profitable for αH -type and isn’t
profitable for the αL-type, so αH -type is revealed by such deviation and the
equilibria from area 2 don’t satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Finally, for the case 3, the revealing profitable deviation for the αH -type is
constructed in the following way. Since q∗p > q
P
L there exists q
′
L < q
P
L (and then
q′L < q
∗
p) such that V (q
′
L, αL) = V (q
∗
p, αL). Notice that q
′
L is on the increasing
part of V (q, αL), so any q < q
′
L is not a profitable deviation for αL. However,
the deviation to q′L is profitable for αH -type (the proof is below), and then the
deviation to q = q′L − ε is the revealing profitable deviation for αH type.
Now I proof that the deviation to q′L is profitable for αH -type. Notice that
the offers q = q′L, q
∗
p are accepted for any Best Response acceptance rule. So,
V (q, a, αj) = V (q, αj) · 1 = q − αjC(q) + αjB
41
qββ2
qPH
qPL
q0E
q0L
1
2
3
Figure 14:
Since V (q′L, αL) = V (q
∗
p, αL), we have
q∗p − αLC(q
∗
p) = q
′
L − αLC(q
′
L)
By using this, we get
q′L − αHC(q
′
L) = q
′
L − αLC(q
′
L) + (αH − αL)C(q
′
L) =
= q∗p − αLC(q
∗
p) + (αH − αL)C(q
′
L) =
= q∗p − αHC(q
∗
p) + (αH − αL)C(q
∗
p) + (αH − αL)C(q
′
L) =
= q∗p − αHC(q
∗
p) + (αH − αL)(C(q
∗
p)− C(q
′
L))
The second term is positive, so
q′L − αHC(q
′
L) > q
∗
p − αHC(q
∗
p)
which gives the required inequality:
V (q′L, αH) > V (q
∗
p, αH)
This finishes the analysis of case 3 and the pooling equilibrium case. We’ve
got that only the equilibria from area 1 satisfy the intuitive criterion.
If equilibrium is separating then, according to Lemma 9, q∗H < q
∗
L = q
0
L and
deviation to q = q∗H + ε doesn’t satisfy (14) for αH due to the same argument
as for the pooling equilibrium with q∗p < q
0
L.
If equilibrium is semi-separating, then for the structure q∗p < q
∗
L = q
0
L the
deviation to q = q∗p + ε for αH doesn’t satisfy (14) due to the same argument.
For the structure q∗H < q
∗
p, consider deviation of the separating part of
equilibrium to q which is closer to qPH : q = q
∗
H + ε if q
∗
H < q
P
H , q = q
∗
H − ε
if q∗H > q
P
H (it’s impossible to have q
∗
H = q
P
H because then αH -type strongly
prefers qPH to the pooling part of the equilibrium candidate q
∗
p , which can’t be
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the case in equilibrium). First, J(q) = {αL} because the αL type is concen-
trated on the pooling part of the equilibrium q∗p; since q < q
∗
p and V (q, αL) is
increasing, deviation to q is unprofitable for αL-type. Second, in the intuitive
criterion (14) a ∈ BR({αH}, q) which means that offer q is accepted with prob-
ability 1: a(q) = 1 and then V ∗H = V (q
∗
H , αH) < min
a∈BR({αH},q)
V (q, a, αH) with
V (q, a, αH) ≡ V (q, αH)).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. For the case 1 all the Principals have α > α×, then, according to Claim
1, the preferred output for all types is feasible. So, accepting all offers qP (α) is
reasonable Best Response for the Agent and gives to all types of the Principal
their unconstrained maximal utility.
For the case 2, first proof that there exists unique solution to (16).
For α = α× we have Eα× [α] < α
×, and, consequently q0 (Eα× [α]) <
q0 (α×) = qP (α×) < qP (Eα× [α]), so the left-hand side of (16) is smaller than
than the right-hand side.
For α = α2 holds Eα× [α] = Eα. So, (15) means that the left-hand side of
(16) is more than the right-hand side.
Since both sides of (16) are continuous, there exists unique solution to this
equation.
Second, consider the Agent’s acceptance rule given the Principal’s offer.
Clearly, all offers q > q˜0 should be reasonable rejected, offers q < q˜0 should be
reasonably accepted with probability 1. The offer q = q˜0 should be accepted
with probability 1 on the equilibrium path because accepting it with probability
a < 1 will make Principal’s deviation to q˜0 − ε profitable.
Finally, ant type of the Principal can’t do better since those with α > α˜
implement their preferred output, and those with α < α˜ could do better only
by implementing q > q˜0 which are rejected.
Case 3 is considered in the same way as the pooling part (α < α˜) in case
2.
Proof of Claim 2
Proof. The statements in 1 and 2 are trivial since the Agent has full flexibility
and hence chooses his preferred back-transfer.
For the third point, notice that if the desired back-transfer q̂ ≤ qA, then
paying back qA will not impose fine and will maximize the Agent’s utility (qA
is the global maximizer).
Consider the case q̂ > qA.
Notice that q˜A(α̂) is constructed in such way that
◦
U(q) >
◦
U(qA)− f for qA(α̂, β) < q̂ < q˜A(α̂, β) (36)
◦
U(q) <
◦
U(qA)− f for q̂ > q˜A(α̂, β) (37)
where
◦
U(q) is the Agent’s utility without taking into account the possibility of
fine: U(q) =
◦
U(q)− fIq<q̂.
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In (36) the Agent prefers to diverge from qA to q > qA as such divergence
isn’t too high whereas in (37) the Agents prefers to pay fine.
Proof of the Proposition 4
Proof. The optimality of the Principal’s decision given the Agents’s belief is
evident from Claim 2. We should check the incentives compatibility conditions
and the crowding-out condition.
Consider the case qLH ≤ q˜LL.
The Principal’s incentive compatibility constraints are
piH(qHH − αHC(qHH )) + (1− piH) · 0 ≥ q˜LL − αHC(q˜LL)
q˜LL − αLC(q˜LL) ≥ piL(qHH − αLC(qHH)) + (1 − piL) · 0
which are equivalent to (22) and (23), correspondingly.
The inequality piH ≤ 1 holds since the denominator in (22) is positive and
the inequality is then equivalent to
C(qHH)− C(q˜LL)
qHH − q˜LL
≤
1
αH
The left-hand side 1
αH
≥ 1. The right-hand side is the slope of the secant
line to the graph of the convex function C(q) between the points with q = q˜LL
and q = qHH , which is smaller than the slope of the tangent line at the point
with q = qHH which is equal to C
′(qHH) = αHβH < 1. So, the inequality holds.
The inequality piL > 0 holds since both the numerator and the denominator
of the fraction are positive.
Finally, we need to check the crowding-out condition piqHH ≥ q˜LL, where pi
is the objective probability of the selfish Agents. Since the selfish Principal has
belief piL which is biased downward, it is sufficient to prove that piLqHH ≥ q˜LL.
Substituting piL into the inequality, we get
q˜LL − αLC(q˜LL)
qHH − αLC(qHH )
qHH ≥ q˜LL
Since the denominator is positive, this inequality is equivalent to
αLq˜LLqHH
(
C(qHH)
qHH
−
C(q˜LL)
q˜LL
)
≥ 0
which holds since qHH > q˜LL, q˜LL < q˜LH and it’s assumed that q˜LH < qHH .
Proof of the Corollary 2
Proof. The condition qLH ≤ q˜LL is equivalent to C(qLH) ≤ C(q˜LL). Since
C(q˜LL) = f , it leads to C(qLH) ≤ f , so that f1 = C(qLH).
Now check the condition q˜LH ≤ qHH .
The back-transfer q˜LH is determined, according to Claim 2 by
αLβHqLH − C(qLH)− f = αLβH q˜LH − C(q˜LH)
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where q˜LH is chosen on the decreasing part of the graph of the function
F (q) = αLβHq − C(q) (see Figure 10). Consequently, q˜LH ≤ qHH is equivalent
to
αLβHqLH − C(qLH)− f ≥ αLβHqHH − C(qHH)
which can be rewritten as
f2 ≡ (αLβHqLH − C(qLH))− (αLβHqHH − C(qHH)) = f2 ≥ f
Finally, to make sure that the interval [f1, f2] is non-empty, we should check
that f1 ≤ f2. This leads to
αLαHβ
2
H
(
qLH
αLβH
−
qHH
αHβH
)
≤ C(qLH)
for a generic cost function.
For the quadratic cost function C(q) = c2q
2, taking into account that qij are
determined by C′(qij) = αiβj , and substituting this into the last inequality, one
can check that the left-hand side is equal to zero, so that the inequality always
holds.
Finally, for given αL, αH , βH , and f ∈ [f1, f2], one can obtain the threshold
values piL ≥ 0, piH ≤ 1 from (22) and (23), and take the values piL and piH ,
satisfying piH ≥ piH , piL ≤ piL. For these parameters, according to Proposition 4,
the equilibrium of the signaling game is the separating crowding-out equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. For the case q ≥ qLH , the incentives compatibility constraints for the
Principal are:
piH(qHH − αHC(qHH)) ≥ q − αHC(q)
q − αLC(q) ≥ piL(qHH − αLC(qHH ))
These constraints are equivalent to the conditions piL ≤ piL and piH ≥ piH ,
which are assumed to hold.
Check the crowding-out condition piqHH ≥ q. Since pi > piL, the inequality
piLqHH ≥ q is stronger. I check the latter inequality for piL = piL.
Substituting the formulae for piL, we get
q˜ − αLC(q˜)
qHH − αLC(qHH)
qHH ≥ q˜
after rearranging it leads to
C(q˜)
q˜
≤
C(qHH)
qHH
which is equivalent to q˜ ≤ qHH since the function C(q) is convex. The latter
inequality is assumed to hold.
So, at least for piL close to piL the crowding-out condition holds.
For the case of q < qLH , the incentives compatibility constraints for the
Principal are:
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piH(qHH − αHC(qHH )) ≥ piH(qLH − αHC(qLH)) + (1− piH)(q − αHC(q))
piL(qLH − αLC(qLH)) + (1− piL)(q − αLC(q)) ≥ piL(qHH − αLC(qHH))
As in the previous case, the crowding-out condition will hold at least for piL
close to q˜L if piLqHH ≥ q. Substituting the expression for piL gives
q − αLC(q)
[qHH − αLC(qHH )] + [q − αLC(q)]− [qLH − αLC(qLH)]
qHH ≥ q
which can be rearranged to
αLqHH
[
C(qHH)
qHH
−
C(q)
q
]
≥ (qLH − q)
[
αL
C(qLH)− C(q)
qLH − q
− 1
]
(38)
The left-hand side term C(qHH )
qHH
− C(q)
q
> 0 because qHH > qLH > q.
The right-hand side term C(qLH)−C(q)
qLH−q
< 1, because it’s a slope of the secant
line to the graph of the increasing convex function C(q), which is lower than
the slope of the tangent line at the right edge of the interval [q, qLH ], C
′(qLH),
for which we have C′(qLH) = αLβH < 1.
So, the right-hand side in (38) is positive, the left-hand side is negative, and,
consequently, the inequality (38) holds.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The proposition is established by checking the equilibrium conditions
case by case.
Consider the no-control pooling equilibrium candidate. Each of the Princi-
pals shouldn’t have an incentive to deviate to control, in which case the output
q will be obtained. For the pooling equilibrium the Agent’s belief on the Princi-
pal’s type on the equilibrium path is Eα, and the pro-social Agent will perform
at the level qEH , determined by C
′(qEH) = EαβH , the selfish Agent will per-
form at level q = 0. So, the two Best Response conditions for the two types of
Principal are
VH = piH(qEH − αHC(qEH)) ≥ q − αHC(q)
VL = piL(qEH − αLC(qEH)) ≥ q − αLC(q)
The two inequalities hold for small q, since the right-hand sides are equal to
0 for q = 0. The first condition which becomes binding for small q determines
the threshold q1.
For the large q, the right-hand sides of the two inequalities are negative.
By decreasing q, the inequality for VL becomes bonding and determines the
threshold q6.
Consider the control pooling equilibrium. The Principals’ Best Response
conditions are (the Agent will reasonable believe that the Principal deviating
to no-control should be the selfish one)
VH = q − αHC(q) ≥ piH(qHH − αHC(qHH ))
VL = q − αLC(q) ≥ piL(qHH − αLC(qHH))
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The inequality for the VH is stronger and determines the lower and upper
bounds for the values of q ∈ [q3, q4] for which the control pooling equilibrium
emerges.
The case of the separating equilibrium is partially considered in Proposition
5. The conditions for the separating equilibrium to the right of the control
pooling region are the same, and the ”right-hand side” separating equilibrium
emerges due to non-monotonicity of the payoff functions. The regions for q are
[q2, q3] on the left and [q4, q5] on the right.
So, all the possible pure strategies equilibria are considered. The regions of
the values of q not covered by the pure strategies equilibria, should bring the
mixed strategies equilibria.
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